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Aesthetics as metaphysical meaning-making
in the face of death
In my ethnographic research on death and dying in contemporary Finland, I explore how Finns facing end of life due to a long-term illness or other terminal 
condition seek to orient themselves and make mean-
ing with cultural tools such as imagery, language, and 
metaphysical thinking. My primary research material 
is based on extensive fieldwork at Terhokoti Hospice 
and in the cancer clinic of Helsinki University Hospital, 
where I have had numerous conversations with termi-
nally ill patients. This paper seeks to explore the way in 
which metaphysical aesthetics is assuming the role that 
religious thinking has traditionally played. When the 
role of institutional religion is diminishing, it becomes 
important to understand how emotional and spiritual 
resolution can be arrived at by means of aesthetics.
Prologue: a blackbird
Heidi was a woman in her fifties suffering from 
colon cancer. Even though seriously ill, she had been 
physically active until recently. A definite turn for 
the worse had happened suddenly, and now she was 
admitted to the Terhokoti hospice ward. The cancer 
was pretty much everywhere in her body, destroy­
ing her spine. She was bedbound and fragile, yet her 
mind was still perky. Because of the metastasis in her 
brain, her memory sometimes lapsed and her speak­
ing was becoming more difficult. Words occasionally 
escaped her, yet she was eager to talk with me.
During our conversation, Heidi spoke about her 
sickness and reflected on her relationship with God, 
which had become more distant. Now I was accom­
panying Heidi to breakfast and I was just about to 
leave when she suddenly called me back. ‘There is 
something I still want to share with you, just in case, 
we don’t… you know.’ She had a meaningful look 
on her face, and I understood the implication of her 
words: just in case we don’t meet again. She started 
to tell me a story and I hastily set up my recording 
device:
I had my grandson at my home and I was put­
ting him down for a nap when I heard a sound 
from the front yard. A cracking noise and so on. 
The dog was alerted also, so we went downstairs 
to see… A hawk was eating a blackbird, there 
in my front yard. [She used her phone to show 
me a picture she had taken, but the picture 
was not very clear.] The front yard was full of 
black feathers, all over the yard, on the white 
snow. They were there for months, those black 
feathers, in the yard, and pieces of bones and 
the head and everything. It was somehow very 
relieving to me at that point… I was imagining 
and picturing that I myself am the blackbird 
being eaten by the hawk there… that I am 
going… to the cycle of the nature. It felt very 
good… gentle, as a thought…
After finishing the story, Heidi remained quiet for 
a while. Then she emphasized the meaningfulness of 
the event by stressing how impressive the experience 
was. She wanted to explain the significance of nature 
to her in general; her relationship with nature had 
grown closer over the past few years. In particular, 
her connection with birds had become stronger since 
she had started learning about forest birds.
I knew instantly that I was sharing an import­
ant memory. But while this story was interesting in 
a number of ways to me as a researcher, why was it 
so important to Heidi that she felt that she needed 
to tell it as – literally – her last words to me? The 
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story seemed to represent a sort of turning point or 
revelation. Looking at the dying blackbird, she knew 
she would be dying from the cancer. But how did 
she know that? One could claim that it was simply 
an obvious analogue between her and the bird, with 
the hawk representing her cancer, which was attack­
ing her body, the blackbird. She probably did have a 
strong embodied experience, in which the analogous 
elements between her and the bird impressed her. 
But this does not fully answer the question of how 
she gained insight into her own existential situation. 
The work of the British philosopher Ronald 
Hepburn helps to illuminate Heidi’s story. Hepburn 
(2004: 127) writes that aesthetic scenes may some­
times be experienced ‘as revealing something funda­
mental (and no doubt grim) about how things really, 
or ultimately, are’. Furthermore, aesthetic experiences 
occasionally do not cause a realization about ultimate 
reality per se, but instead seem to point to something 
completely other, to ‘a transcendent Source for which 
we lack words and clear concepts’, as Hepburn (ibid.) 
suggests. In Heidi’s case, her experience was very 
poignant in terms of ‘how things ultimately are’.
Reflecting on Hepburn’s words, I realized that I 
had heard other stories from my research partici­
pants where an aesthetic experience had led them 
to a realization of their existential situation and the 
ultimate reality of things. This sort of aesthetic appre­
ciation is involved in what Hepburn (2004: 127) calls 
‘metaphysical imagination’. For reasons that I will 
explore and explain in this paper, however, I would 
call it ‘metaphysical meaning­making’. Metaphysics 
can be defined as an inquiry into the ultimate nature 
of things, a study about what ultimately is and what 
it is like. Therefore, the limits of being and questions 
about non­being are essentially metaphysical mat­
ters. Often actualized by terminal illness, these were 
reflected on in various ways by my study participants.
In this article, I will describe and analyse experi­
ences which proved to be illuminating to my study 
participants in regards to their metaphysical mean­
ing­making around death and dying. It became clear 
to me during my research that aesthetics, as a way 
of thinking about and processing matters of life and 
death, is vaster and more varied than the examples 
in this article may suggest. Thus, I will focus on the 
philosophical premises of the phenomenon that I 
call ‘aesthetics as metaphysical meaning making’. 
The article begins with a short introduction of my 
research material and a description of the ethno­
graphic process. Then I will define my theoretical 
frame of ‘cultural embodiment’, developed by Thomas 
Csordas, and some of the key concepts of the study. 
This will be followed by actual analysis of the experi­
ences. I conclude by offering a general overview of 
the meaning of aesthetics for dying people, as well as 
by discussing the concept of ‘metaphysical meaning­
making’ and ‘aesthetic experience’ as useful concep­
tual tools at the end of life.
Ethnographic research data
This article is based on ethnographic research data1 
which I gathered during the years 2014–16. The 
study of death and dying, especially in ethnographic 
settings, includes ethical issues which have been 
carefully considered while planning the course of the 
study. The Ethical Board of the Hospital District of 
Helsinki and Uusimaa (HUS) granted approval for 
the study, which included signed consents from over 
twenty participants.
1 The research data, collected from Terhokoti Hospice 
and the Cancer Clinic of Helsinki University Hos­
pital (HYKS), comprises recorded and unrecorded 
interviews and conversations, in addition to research 
diaries. According to the Hospital District of Helsinki 
and Uusimaa (HUS) guidelines, the data will be 
archived for ten years upon completion of the study, 
after which it will be destroyed. Although this prac­
tice is unusual in the social sciences, it is typical in the 
medical field, especially in the case of a sensitive area 
of research, such as hospice and palliative care.
Dead bird in the autumn forest.
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In the beginning of 2014, I started visiting the 
so­called ‘day group’ at Terhokoti Hospice. The day 
group consists of patients accepted as patients at the 
hospice, but who are still capable of living at home 
and receiving palliative care at other medical institu­
tions, such as the cancer ward at HYKS. Being the 
first step in hospice, the transition is often very emo­
tional and significant for the patients, even though 
one can remain in the day group for years before 
actual admission to the ward at Terhokoti.
I paid weekly visits to my ‘Tuesday crew’ during 
the spring of 2014. In the summer, when the day 
group stopped meeting, I conducted research for a 
few weeks in the hospice ward itself, where I spent 
6–12 hours per day. I continued to be in contact with 
my Tuesday crew by phone, as well as by sometimes 
visiting them in their homes. For a few weeks, I also 
visited the cancer ward at HYKS on a daily basis, 
when I simply followed the daily routine and spoke 
here and there with patients, family members, and 
hospital staff. Occasionally I also found patients who 
were interested in the research. I continued to visit 
Terhokoti until the spring of 2016. 
In this way, I met a number of different kinds of 
informants. I spent only a few hours talking with some, 
sometimes recording our conversations. Others I met 
with over a longer period of time. Finally, there were 
also patients who became so­called ‘key informants’ 
in a classic anthropological sense. Given the longer 
time span, close relationships developed, some of 
which are still active.
The examples I present in this article are chosen 
from this material, on both the basis of their rele­
vance and their variety. Although aesthetics is 
related in multiple ways to the lives and deaths of 
my research participants, here I seek to discuss the 
moments that especially illuminate the spon taneity of 
aesthetic experiences and the multiple ways in which 
they manifested in the everyday life of the patients. 
Each story is different – and yet they share a common 
aspect of aesthetics.
In this article, I will be talking about Heidi and 
Oiva, who were patients at Terhokoti, and Martti 
and Helena, whom I met at the hospital.2 All of 
these patients were close to me, especially Martti 
and Helena, whom I knew for a long period of time. 
2 The names and some personal details have been 
changed in order to protect the identities of the re­
search participants.
During the summer and autumn of 2014, I also 
experienced a personal loss: my mother was diag­
nosed with inoper able cancer in June and she died 
in October, only four months later. Sharing with her 
about her medical treatments, as well as witness­
ing her personal struggle with the illness, naturally 
broadened my perspective.
Terminal illness:  
methodological thoughts from the field
From my perspective as a researcher, and also as a 
daughter whose mother passed through a brief but 
intense period of illness before death, I see termin­
ally ill people often facing a chaotic life situation 
filled with daunting questions and tensions, ranging 
from various social issues to physical, psychological, 
and existential uncertainties. In our contemporary 
society, where people’s social roles are created mainly 
on the basis of professional and economic status, 
as well as their bodily health and youthful outlook, 
the change that terminal illness brings about is dras­
tic. Change contains many aspects, from the purely 
pragmatic challenges of everyday life to more philo­
sophical questions about the value of human life. In 
practice, the ordinary everyday reality of a working 
person changes quite suddenly to that of a sick pen­
sioner, whose free schedule is structured perhaps 
only by (ir)regular meetings at various medical clin­
ics, and for whom the only certainty is death. On the 
other hand, when bodily functions start to fail, ques­
tions of dignity and the value of human life arise in 
many patient’s minds, causing anxiety.
Talking about death and dying in the first or 
second person continues to be a more or less taboo 
subject, even – or perhaps especially – among termin­
ally ill patients. Thus, whenever my research patients 
started sharing their thoughts or feelings about death 
and dying, it was always a rare and special moment. 
I seldom asked about these things directly; instead 
I waited for patients to open that conversation, as I 
wanted to see how they would initiate the topic. By 
listening attentively, I was able to recognize their 
tentative attempts to apprehend their situation. This 
article deals with those exact moments when my 
research patients started to open up and share experi­
ences which had pushed them to think of their own 
death and enabled them to realize something crucial 
about their existential situation.
During the first six months of my ethnography, I 
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did not initiate the theme 
of ‘art’ or ‘aesthetics’ in 
conservations with my 
research patients unless it 
was present in their lives 
in some obvious way, as 
was the case with a pair 
of artists. After sensing 
that there was something 
noteworthy about the 
theme, however, I did 
begin inquiring about 
it. I would ask about the 
patient’s relationship with 
art or about their aes­
thetic experiences in gen­
eral. I only used the term 
‘aesthetic’ (esteettinen in 
Finnish) quite rarely, as 
in everyday usage the term has a somewhat multi­
valent meaning: many people think that aesthetics 
refers automatically to beauty, whereas in a scholarly 
sense the concept can mean anything that people find 
meaningful in a sensorial way (see e.g. Plate 2005). 
With some participants, however, the conversation 
shifted to quite explicitly include the meaning of aes­
thetics and art for them.
In an analytical sense, the concept of ‘aesthetic 
experience’ emerged only after doing ethnography 
for over a year. I had paid attention to stories – like 
Heidi’s above – which were seemingly meaningful 
to the study participants, but it was only later that 
I realized their common features and labelled them 
‘aesthetic experiences’. Thus, the notion of aesthetic 
experience was originally an etic term introduced by 
me. As we will see, one of the research patients dis­
cussed here resonated with the term so much that she 
started using it quite deliberately, as if it was analytic­
ally useful for her as well, in an emic manner.
After focusing on the theme, I realized that issues 
of art and aesthetics are present in many of my 
research patients’ lives, either in special moments 
or in everyday situations. Some of them actively 
engaged in the creation of art, such as writing, paint­
ing, picture­making, and so on. One of the research 
participants had even taken part in another study 
concerning the meaning of visual art at the end of 
life, for which she had written about her experiences 
with certain paintings. Some had consciously looked 
for an aesthetically pleasing environment where they 
could meditate or rest 
when feeling especially 
sick. It is a well­known 
fact that art has a benefi­
cial effect on health (see 
Nummelin 2011).
Manifold uses of art 
and aesthetics can be 
meaningful for patients 
when they are in the 
process of making sense 
of their situation. Here I 
focus on aesthetic expe­
riences, which at times 
were actively sought after 
(for instance, by reading 
poetry), but which often 
also happened quite sud­
denly and accidentally, 
making deep impressions (as seen in Heidi’s story). 
My main argument is that these sorts of aesthetic 
experiences help people to handle complex and 
ambiguous existential issues and that they facil itate 
metaphysical meaning­making in a challenging 
existential situation. The purpose of this article is to 
analyse what happens in these experiences and how 
metaphysical meaning­making is possible. I use the 
general theoretical approach of cultural phenom­
enology as developed by the anthropologist Thomas 
Csordas (1990, 1994, 1999). In my analysis, I also use 
notions from various phenomenological and existen­
tialist philosophers on aesthetics.
Cultural phenomenology and an aesthetic experience
The phenomenological way of seeing the human posi­
tion in the world seems to be effective when studying 
temporal and situational subjects, such as a dying 
person. The Husserlian critique towards the scientific 
manner of relating to the world as the only legitimate 
way of achieving adequate information about it is 
poignant when one is trying to gain an understand­
ing of such ideas as ‘being’ and ‘non­being’. In other 
words, when one is forced to face the paradox of 
‘death within life’, ‘ending time’, or ‘non­existence’, sci­
entific (medical) language offers few tools to compre­
hend the situation and grasp the finality of existence. 
Furthermore, according to my experiences in the 
field, religious language only speaks to some people. 
It may be able to console them, but for the most part, 
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Finns, especially in the Helsinki area, tend towards a 
more secular view or have a relationship with spirit­
uality which is not aligned with traditional Lutheran 
theology or language. Therefore, there seems to be 
a certain void regarding an adequate language of 
death.3 Ultimately, it may even be, as Husserl seems 
to claim with the concept of ‘inner time’, that man 
cannot grasp the idea of a last moment, timeless time, 
and the finitude of personal existence (Heinämaa 
2010: 88).
The lack of a ‘language of death’ causes further 
questions about the relation of language to experi­
ence. Commenting on the prior emphasis on text­
uality, discourse, and representation in the fields 
of anthropology and religious studies, Csordas 
(1999) points out that there has been somewhat of 
a tendency to reduce human experience to language. 
Noting how my research participants tried to com­
municate their thoughts and feelings about the end of 
life, dying, and death, it is easy to see how they found 
it hard to express themselves verbally (or in any way 
even), as if accurate and adequate words were miss­
ing.4 However, this lack of language does not refer to 
a lack of an experience of dying. I would claim rather 
that because the experience of terminal illness is so 
powerful, there is an acute search for meaningful 
methods and means to handle, think, and commu­
nicate about it. Experiences of aesthetics derive their 
meaningfulness from this need to communicate.
The experiences discussed in this article were, 
of course, communicated to me via language, and 
usually they were told in the form of a story or a nar­
rative, which seemed to be already formed in the 
mind of the patient. The subject of my analysis is not 
the linguistic format or the rhetoric of those stories. 
Although this could be one way to approach the sub­
3 In February 2016, I attended a symposium on death 
(Kuolema Symposium) in Joensuu where various 
professionals in the field of death and dying (such as 
priests, doctors and nurses) were lecturing. In one of 
the conversations, someone stated that in Helsinki, 
the traditional Christian spiritual language ‘doesn’t 
speak to people any longer’, and that there is a ‘need 
to develop new kinds of religious expressions in order 
to touch people’. In an article in Helsingin Sanomat 
(5.4.2015), the hospice patient Pietari Vanhala states: 
‘We don’t even have a vocabulary to handle the death 
of those who do not believe in a soul or the super­
natural.’
4 About the limits of words in regard to dying, see also 
Irving 2009.
ject matter, following Csordas I do not look at these 
stories as linguistic representations but instead treat 
them as embodied experiences.
In the theoretical approach of cultural phenom­
enology, an experience is not seen as constituted by 
language; rather, language discloses an experience. 
Csordas does not deny the denominative and cre ative 
power of language, but he suggests a way to study 
experiences that emphasizes their embodied nature 
over their representational aspects. Semiotics has its 
place in cultural studies, but in cultural phenomenol­
ogy the focus lies more in the participatory and rela­
tional aspect of human experience: ‘semiotics gives us 
textuality in order to understand representation, phe­
nomenology gives us embodiment in order to under­
stand being­in­the­world’ (Csordas 1999: 146–7).
Here the term ‘embodiment’ can be seen empiric­
ally as a basic human relationality towards the world, 
stressing our bodily engagement with it. Embodiment 
is also understood as ‘the existential ground of cul­
ture and self ’ (Csordas 1994: 6), which suggests that 
we are able to find our way to culture or ourselves 
only via our bodily existence. Therefore, studies that 
focus on embodiment are ultimately not about the 
body per se, but about ‘culture and experience … 
understood from the standpoint of bodily being­
in­the­world’ (Csordas 1999: 143). This paradigm 
of embodiment provides us with a way of finding ‘a 
sense of existential meaning beyond representational 
meaning’ (Csordas 1999: 147), which is exactly what 
I am interested in doing in my study.
Thus, instead of analysing isolated representa­
tional elements or themes of stories, as interesting as 
they may be (such as Heidi’s reference to the cycle of 
nature), my task in this article is to focus on experi­
ence as a unit in itself while treating the concept of an 
experience in a Deweyan sense, following his theory 
of aesthetics (Dewey 1980 [1934]). Simply put, John 
Dewey differentiated experience from an experience. 
We are constantly having experiences, and life is con­
stituted by a chain of experiences which in essence is 
‘the result of interaction between a live creature and 
some aspect of the world in which he lives’ (Dewey 
1980: 4). This quote shows that Dewey’s understand­
ing of the human position in the world involves 
relationality and is akin to Heidegger’s ‘being­in­
the­world’. The kind of experiences I focus on here 
can be seen as an experience, which has a unity of 
its own: ‘…we have an experience when the material 
experienced runs its course to fulfilment.’ Dewey 
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explains, ‘The existence of this unity is constituted 
by a single quality that pervades the entire experi­
ence in spite of the variation of its constituent parts’ 
(35–7). Dewey assumes that every real experience 
also has certain aesthetic qualities, such as structure 
and rhythm; therefore, an experience is always aes­
thetic experience.5 In regards to actual art products, 
Dewey posits that aesthetics is not merely found in 
artistic objects or in the audience, but that aesthet­
ics happens in the experience, in the relational act 
of experiencing – hence the title of his book Art as 
Experience (1934).
The term ‘art’ is also treated here in a Deweyan 
sense: ‘Art is a quality of doing and of what is done’ 
(Dewey 1980: 214). In other words, instead of seeing 
art as a thing, art is understood as a quality. Here I 
refer to art in exactly this way: art is a quality that can 
5 As pointed out by Kalle Puolakka (2014), Dewey 
never explicitly defined the concept of an ‘aesthetic 
experience’, yet this kind of interpretation arises quite 
naturally from his writings. 
be found in various places and acts. This also seems 
to be the way that most of my research participants 
used the word ‘art’ – although some research par­
ticipants never explicitly talked about ‘art’ per se, but 
simply made references to certain novels or poems, 
for instance, which had caused them to engage in 
metaphysical thought. 
Embodied perception and disrupted intentionality 
Aesthetic experiences can be seen as highly embodied 
experiences. It is my hypothesis that it is precisely this 
embodied aspect that makes aesthetic experiences 
so powerful – and also insightful – for the patients.6 
This aspect is apparent in many of the stories, but 
here I will share Martti’s story, which is illuminating 
in terms of how his whole bodily being was affected 
by his aesthetic experience. Martti is an important 
6 About embodied aesthetics and metaphysical experi­
ence, see e.g. Thorgeirsdottir 2010.
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example, as he had a strong Christian faith, unlike 
most of my research patients.
Martti (60 years old) had been seeing a doctor 
for a while because of severe tiredness and a lack of 
energy. When a swelling suddenly appeared in his 
testicles, cancer was immediately suspected (and 
tests later confirmed lymphoma). Martti was sent 
to the hospital for an ultrasound. Sitting in his car 
with the radio on, he heard a certain piece of classical 
music: John Tavener’s Eternal Memory.7 Martti felt 
that the music ‘went to his soul’, and he had a vision. 
He saw himself in a beautiful green landscape, liter­
ally in ‘green pastures’, which he interpreted with­
out any hesitation to be paradise. He felt very safe: 
‘I suddenly felt very good, that this [afterlife] isn’t 
such a bad alternative to this [world]. I have seen this 
[world] already for 60 years… [The vision] was a per­
plexing experience.’ This sensory experience made a 
strong impact on Martti, and he referred to it during 
our very first interview in July 2014, and then again 
in the autumn of 2015. Martti explained to me why 
the experience was so powerful: he thereby knew that 
‘it was all ok; there was nothing to worry about. I was 
either going to be cured, or, if not, I was going to be 
with God. There were only two alternatives – and 
they were both good ones.’ 
Martti was a believer, but it wasn’t the word of 
God or a prayer that opened his heart to this deeply 
calming realization about his situation. It was music, 
an auditory and aesthetic experience, which led to 
another aesthetic experience, in the form of a vision 
of paradise, which he later connected with the famous 
passage in the Psalms: ‘He makes me lie down in green 
pastures. He leads me beside still waters; he restores 
my soul’ (Psalm 23:2–3). Also significant was the fact 
that Martti referred to this incident when I asked him 
about his overall feelings or thoughts about his situ­
ation. This had been the moment when an attitude, or 
a perspective, about his existential situation was born 
in him. Given his level of faith, it was not surprising 
that he felt confident. The striking point was that a 
visual experience and the impact of music – the aes­
thetics of the situation – brought him this confidence.
Martti’s story raises the question of percep­
7 At the time he did not know this particular piece of 
music, but after being impressed by the experience he 
later went online to do a search about the radio pro­
gram in order to find the name of the composer and 
the piece in question. Since then, he often listened to 
it. 
tion. The phenomenological approach to percep­
tion emphasizes the bodily dimension of perceptual 
experience, that is, what is perceived in us. Perception 
happens in the body with the faculties of the body 
– a notion that was especially important to Maurice 
Merleau­Ponty (2005 [1945]). Martti heard the music 
with his ears, felt safe in and with his body (as well as 
with God), and saw himself with his body in green 
pastures. Criticizing the Cartesian dualism of mind 
and body which does not respond to our experi ence 
of the world, of being­in­the­world, Merleau­Ponty 
holds that meanings happen in an intertwined con­
nection of subject and object. When one’s body is sick, 
one is in – or with – that body, and experiences and 
questions about the relationality of mind and body 
arise in multiple ways. Martti’s story demonstrates 
how meaning­making happens in an intertwined 
aesthetic connection between the inner (subjective) 
reality and the outer (objective) reality.
Intentionality is another key concept that explains 
human positioning in the world, and it is of special 
interest in my study of the experiences of the dying. 
We are always intending the world in some specific 
way; as humans, we are always positioned towards 
something with an intention to make sense of it. 
Spruce. 
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Learning about terminal illness causes a disruption 
in the previous positioning and shifts our intention­
ality, bringing death into our immediate horizon. By 
this disruption, we are pushed towards a more con­
scious manner of looking at the world and our place 
in it – a philosophical exercise that existentialists 
would call ‘an active practice of the human freedom’, 
whereas for phenomenologists it would denote the 
practice of ‘disclosing the world’ in which intention­
ality, referring to a manner of relating to the world, 
largely dictates experience (Deranty 2015).
It might be useful here to follow Husserl’s dis­
tinction, noted by Merleau­Ponty (2005: xx), of the 
intentionality of an act and operative intentionality. 
Intentionality of an act refers to our everyday judge­
ments, meaning the conscious and voluntary posi­
tions and attitudes that we take towards the world 
and its phenomena. Operative intentionality, how­
ever, is something more embodied, non­represen­
tational and pre­conceptual. In Phenomenology of 
Perception (2005: 498), Merleau­Ponty writes: ‘We 
found beneath the intentionality of acts, or thetic 
intentionality, another kind which is the condition of 
the former’s possibility: namely an operative inten­
tionality already at work before any positing or any 
judgement…’ Following Merleau­Ponty, operative 
intentionality can be understood as arising from our 
deep bodily engagement with the world: ‘The world 
is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject 
which is nothing but a project of the world, and the 
subject is insepar able from the world, but from a 
world which the subject itself projects’ (2005: 499–
500). We are always already in the world, and our 
‘consciousness is already at work in the world’ (2005: 
502), and hence we always have some engagement 
with it before any conscious propositional thought.
Mark Johnson (1987, 2007; see also Lakoff and 
Johnson 1999) has continued to develop Merleau­
Ponty’s idea of operational intentionality, for instance 
by linking it with the recent findings of cognitive sci­
ence. In The Meaning of the Body, Johnson (2007: 51) 
writes about body­based meaning­making, which he 
calls embodied or immanent meaning.8 For Johnson, 
8 Johnson and Csordas are not alone in emphasizing 
the embodied aspect of meaning­making. Since 
the 1990s, the humanities and social sciences have 
witnessed what some scholars call a ‘sensory turn’ 
(Howes 2015: vii) with renewed interest in the bodily, 
sensory, and aesthetic aspects of being, as well as 
intentionality arises primarily from our bodily exist­
ence: ‘we learn to understand our world not with 
conceptual and propositional knowledge, but more 
fundamentally, via bodily interactions and feelings’ 
(ibid.). Intersubjectivity also plays a crucial role in 
the process: we are not isolates but we learn and live 
in relation to others, ‘in and through others’ (ibid.).
It is quite natural that both kinds of intentional­
ities – intentionality of an act and operational inten­
tionality – are shifted during a time of terminal ill­
ness. When the body starts to fail, it disrupts our 
corporeal engagement with the world. I witnessed 
my study participants attempting to redirect their 
intentionality in such a way that it would bring about 
a meaningful relationship with their life, end of life, 
and ultimately death. For some, aesthetic experiences 
helped them in this process. However, this was not 
always possible, and it was not possible for everyone.
During the months of my ethnography, I spent 
hours by the bedside of a number of dying people. 
Not all of them were research participants, but as I 
also served as a volunteer during my ethnography in 
Terhokoti Hospice, I was sometimes sent to simply 
stay by the patients’ bed. During this time, as well 
as during the period I spent with my mother when 
 emphases on the study of experience inspired by 
philosophers such as Merleau­Ponty and Dewey. 
For instance, Michael Jackson’s (1996, 2013) work 
on phenomenological and existential anthropology 
is important here, as is the interdisciplinary field 
of ‘somaesthetics’ introduced by Richard Shuster­
man (1999, 2012) and discussed further in Journal 
of Somaesthetics (founded in 2015). In the field of 
anthropology, studies in ‘anthropology of the sensible’, 
or ‘sensory anthropology’, have gained increasing in­
terest (see e.g. Howes 1991; Howes and Classen 2014; 
Ingold 2000, 2011; Laplantine 2015 [2005]; Pink 
2009; the journal The Senses and Society, launched 
in 2006). In the field of religious studies, Diana Eck 
shifted the focus to the materiality and visuality of 
religion already in 1981 with her book on darshan, 
which has since been followed by such scholars as 
Birgit Meyer (2015), Jon P. Mitchell and Michael 
Bull (2015), David Morgan (2005, 2010) and Brent S. 
Plate (2005), leading to the creation of a new journal, 
Material Religion, in 2005. Interestingly related to 
the subject matter of this article, recent publications 
by the anthropologists Robert Desjarlais (2016) and 
Andrew Irving (2016, see also 2013) are about death 
and dying in Nepal and New York, respectively, dis­
cussed from an embodied, perceptual, aesthetic, and 
phenomenological point of view.
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she was sick, I witnessed a kind of internal uneasi­
ness, which I would describe as a deep metaphysical 
disorien tation – or as a disrupted operative inten­
tionality. At times, the patient did not know whether 
they should strive for life or death, try to concentrate 
on breathing, or wish for the breathing to stop for­
ever. Sometimes this intensified in outbursts of cries 
of despair. These were intense moments expressed via 
bodily motions, usually without any words. 
To summarize, intentionality is a helpful concept 
when looking at a person’s positioning in the world. 
Operational, or functional, intentionality can be seen 
as an elementary feature of human life, as it facilitates 
developing a meaningful relationship with the world. 
Being diagnosed with a terminal illness challenges 
our previous ways of perceiving and relating to life, 
thereby also disrupting our intentionality. Here aes­
thetic experience may help patients in their attempts 
to intend the world in a new and meaningful way.
Rhythm and meditation on beauty 
In the context of cultural phenomenology, percep­
tion and intentionality are not seen as simply subjec­
tive practices. According to Merleau­Ponty, the per­
ceiver, the thing perceived, and the act of perceiving 
all seem to come together in a manner that makes 
clear distinctions difficult:
As I contemplate the blue of the sky I am not 
set over against it as an acosmic subject; I do 
not possess it in thought, or spread out towards 
it some idea of blue such as might reveal the 
secret of it, I abandon myself to it and plunge 
into this mystery, it ‘thinks itself within me,’ I 
am the sky itself as it is drawn together and uni­
fied, and as it begins to exist for itself; my con­
sciousness is saturated with this limitless blue. 
(Merleau­Ponty 2005: 249, italics in original)
This famous quote from Merleau­Ponty aptly 
reflects what Helena told me about her relationship 
to ‘aesthetics’. Helena was around 45 years old, and 
she was dying from breast cancer. She had been diag­
nosed three years before, but over the past year her 
condition had gotten significantly worse. As I knew 
Helena’s background and hobbies – she had studied 
various arts and humanities in the university and was 
very interested in literature, as well as the visual arts – 
I had talked to her explicitly about aesthetics and art. 
When I asked what aesthetics meant to her, she told 
me the following:
H: Aesthetics has always been important to me, 
like in everyday life at home and so forth… It 
is one of those [things] that really helps me in 
life, that if there is something beautiful around 
me. When I became sick I was in the beginning 
still able of to go out a lot [into nature], I have 
always liked walking a lot, just to the nature 
like… from the nature you get anyhow so much 
power, but seeing the beauty there… It helps me 
a lot that… How would I put this? Maybe it is 
somehow meditative to me. It has always been 
important to me that wherever I am, I always 
try to look for the most beautiful spot of the 
place, and then just plunge (sukellan) into it, or 
vanish… stare at it or… like…
Autumn light in the forest.
Maija Butters
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Me: Like you draw (ammennat) from it?
H: Yes, I draw from it. I noticed with this sick­
ness that… Like I have always had this, but I 
noticed that since becoming sick, it has become 
much stronger. I am terribly glad that I have 
this kind of… Could I call it a skill? An abil­
ity to do that. Because it has helped me ter­
ribly a lot, especially when I have been really 
sick, just lying in bed, that then something 
so small, some small detail can help, like just 
having a candle on the table to just stare at… 
well, a candle is perhaps a very typical focus of 
meditation anyhow, but just having something 
on which you can focus your gaze, something 
visual…
Helena then continued to tell me about her previ­
ous apartment, which had had huge windows open­
ing onto a forest. She had the curtains taken away so 
that she could have an unobstructed view. During the 
worst moments of physical sickness, Helena said that 
she had simply stared outside for hours: ‘there was 
always something to see, in the clouds or trees… It 
has really been… the salvation of salvations to me, 
this skill.’ I asked Helena if this sort of ‘plunging 
into visual details’ could happen with manmade art 
objects? Helena exclaimed:
H: Oh yes! That is why it has been so wonderful 
to me that my daughter is now doing photog­
raphy. It brings me such great enjoyment in 
life. … What I share in Facebook, combining a 
photo with some text… although on Facebook 
they just look like an image and a text, for me 
they are powerful… like I get a really deep 
source of power from them. I really experi­
ence them like a kind of bigger creation… that 
there is a picture and that I am able to create 
some text to go with it. That is actually one of 
my dreams, like we talked about the things one 
would want to do before… that I would do a 
book with my daughter, where there are her 
photos and my text. 
This wish was important to Helena. She told 
me that sometimes she was unable to sleep at night 
because she was anxiously thinking about the book 
and fearing to not have enough time to finish it. Then 
she continued about aesthetic objects:
H: I also have certain important objects, like 
we all do, whose mere presence in a given space 
empowers me. I have two books that work 
like this for me: a poetry book and one that 
combines images and text. They are wonderful 
as texts, but also as aesthetic objects they are 
insanely great.
When I tried to ask her what exactly happened 
during those aesthetic moments when she was 
‘plunging in’, she answered:
H: For the most part it is just like… well, I 
experience it like ‘being present in the moment’, 
which is today such a cliché expression [laughs], 
but in those moments… It is an experience 
of non­stressedness. It can be liberating. … 
But at its best, it feels like it opens up another 
dimension of reality, especially at those times 
when there has been some difficult situation 
of hardcore pain or intense psychic pain. It has 
been really great then that there are those kinds 
of gateways… that one can get away.
Having reflected on this, Helena shared that she 
was probably inclined to sense aesthetics in this way 
because of her heavily religious background and 
childhood. She came from a very religious commu­
nity which not only had a strong Christian ethos, but 
also ‘a vivid charismatic surrounding where all kinds 
of things, even strange ones, were happening’. As an 
adult, Helena no longer agreed with the Pentecostal 
theology of her childhood church, yet she felt that 
her background had taught her that the world was 
not merely composed of visible, materialistic dimen­
sions: ‘That is what I am thankful for, that gift that I 
have gotten, since I was small, that there exist also 
other worlds where you can… like, it isn’t just about 
this reality where we are, but there also exists some 
other, very rich reality…’9
When Helena speaks about ‘plunging into’ the 
object, she literally repeats Merleau­Ponty’s descrip­
tion of the act of perceiving. Staring at the object, she 
9 The connection that Helena herself draws between 
her present aesthetic imagination and her Pentecostal 
background is a very interesting one, which demands 
to be elaborated more, especially on the basis of Tanya 
Luhrmann’s ‘absorption hypothesis’ (Luhrmann et al. 
2010). 
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was able to almost ‘vanish’ into it. Here again is the 
familiar blending of the inner and the outer, already 
seen with Martti’s story. Helena’s experience also 
has a mystical, even magical, flavour to it. Yet, the 
common denominator in all of the different instances 
she was describing – whether her experience had to 
do with nature, visualizations of details, or material, 
artistic objects – was aesthetics. It was aesthetics that 
ultimately seemed to empower her.
Another interesting element found in Helena’s 
experience is rhythm. Helena talked about times of 
being severely sick and in pain, unable to do any­
thing but lie in bed. Time easily loses structure when 
‘nothing happens’; this was a general remark by many 
patients. Structure and rhythm are necessary in order 
to orient in the world. Dewey writes extensively 
about rhythm, not only in aesthetic experiences but 
also as an aspect of nature. For Dewey, rhythm is one 
of the main qualities of the material world, which 
makes existence of artistic forms possible. According 
to Dewey (1980: 150), rhythm is ‘a universal scheme 
of existence’ and, as such, it also ‘pervades all the 
arts’: ‘Underneath the rhythm of every art and of 
every work of art there lies, as a substratum in the 
depths of the subconsciousness, the basic pattern of 
the relations of the live creature to his environment.’ I 
suggest that by dwelling in beauty and meditating on 
various aesthetic aspects of the natural world, Helena 
was able to find traces of these rhythms of life, which 
not only provide aesthetic experiences but reflect 
existence itself in a very biological sense.
Helena’s comment about an aesthetic experience 
being a ‘gateway’ to another dimension of reality 
approaches Susanne Langer’s (1959) notion of the 
virtuality of art. Art as a virtual space or a virtual time 
means that art creates virtual or imagined dimen­
sions for us to enjoy – or that ultimately art is those 
dimensions. This reminds of what Dewey wrote 
about imagination. When studying the psychology of 
an aesthetic experience, Dewey accords imagination 
a special place in the processes of artistic creativity. 
But imagination is not only at play during moments 
of making or observing art. Dewey (1980: 267) writes 
about the general ways in which the mind meets the 
world: ‘When old and familiar things are made new 
in experience, there is imagination. When the new 
is created, the far and strange become the most nat­
ural inevitable things in the world. There is always 
some measure of adventure in the meeting of mind 
and universe, and this adventure is, in its measure, 
imagination.’ This, in turn, echoes Hepburn’s concept 
of ‘metaphysical imagination’ mentioned above.
Aesthetic experiences, as they present themselves 
here, are moments where the familiar meets the 
unknown, the strange and even the scary. Aesthetic 
experiences are flavoured and saturated by imagin­
ation, thereby creating a space where a person is 
able to re­orient and find new, relevant metaphys­
ical meanings. Furthermore, there is an embodied 
quality in the process, as Andrew Irving (2009: 298) 
states in regard to visual art: ‘…the dialogue between 
image and imagination is in part a physical, bodily 
phenomenon that involves movement and being 
moved through exchanges of meaning’. I would sug­
gest that the reason why aesthetic experiences were 
so immensely ‘helpful’ and served as a ‘salvation’ to 
Helena is that these moments enabled her to estab­
lish and maintain a relationship or connection with 
the world. This connection, which the Christian phi­
losopher Gabriel Marcel (1973) would probably call 
‘ontological exigence’, renders existential orientation 
and metaphysical meaning­making possible.
In Helena’s case, aesthetics supported her survival 
during extremely challenging existential moments. 
Furthermore, aesthetic experiences were essential for 
her metaphysical understanding of the world, and 
they also assured her about the existence of ‘another 
dimension’, which in turn gave death a special posi­
tion. The manner in which Helena experienced her 
environment, as well as her intense wish to complete 
the book project, brings me to existentialist views on 
aesthetic experience.
Art as revelation:  
the meaning of aesthetic experience 
Being a naturalist, Dewey took aesthetic qualities, 
such as rhythm, to fundamentally be properties of 
nature itself. For existentialists such as Jean­Paul 
Sartre, however, meanings are constituted by our acts 
and by our consciousness intending the world in a 
certain way and imposing certain order on external 
phenomena. In and of itself, the world does have 
meanings, but ultimately it requires human con­
sciousness to reveal them: ‘With each of our acts, the 
world reveals to us a new face. But, if we know that 
we are directors of being, we also know that we are 
not its producers’ (Sartre 1949: 38–39).
At the core there lies a tension: our perception 
‘reveals’ the world, making us ‘directors of being’, yet 
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simultaneously we know that the world will continue 
even after we are no longer perceiving it. According 
to Sartre, it is precisely this paradox and a feeling of 
being inessential to the world that gives people the 
urge to create art:
One of the chief motives of artistic creation is 
certainly the need of feeling that we are essential 
in relationship to the world. If I fix on canvas or 
in writing a certain aspect of the fields or the 
sea or a look on someone’s face which I have 
disclosed, I am conscious of having produced 
them by condensing relationships, by introduc­
ing order where there was none, by imposing the 
unity of mind on the diversity of things. That is, 
I feel essential in relation to my creation. (Sartre 
1949: 39, my italics)
The audience needs to be able to recognize these 
structures in order to enjoy art aesthetically. But 
what happens in situations where a person suddenly 
experi ences their environment, or a detail in it, in a 
deeply aesthetic manner? I would claim that an act of 
perceiving can in itself become the sort of creative act 
which Sartre describes above. This is actually what 
happened to Helena: she was able to perceive beauty 
and aesthetic experiences in many places, as long 
as she concentrated. Just as in Sartre’s quote above, 
she condensed relationships, introduced order, and 
imposed unity on her environment in order to gain 
an aesthetic experience. From an existentialist’s point 
of view, she was practising her human freedom. This 
act, which reveals her attitude towards the world, was 
her existential choice (Deranty 2015).
We can also find this type of artistic creativity in 
my final story. Oiva was a 70­year­old artist who had 
been fighting cancer for several years. During the six 
months I knew him, his condition had gotten stead­
ily worse. Previously he had received home care, but 
finally he was admitted to the hospice ward. He knew 
he only had a matter of days left, and we were having 
long conversations. Even when severely ill and so 
close to death, he was enthusiastic about telling 
his thoughts to me. He shared a memory about his 
wife’s death, which had happened already some years 
before. Because she had been cremated, he had gone 
with his son to pick up the urn to take it for burial in 
the cemetery.
He explained: ‘I remember the picture from that 
situation. There was only me, my wife’s urn, my son 
and the cemetery worker who showed us the place. … 
The picture that stayed here [pointing to his head]… 
it was…’ Oiva was getting emotional, and it became 
difficult for him to utter the words. ‘When… my son 
was born…’ Oiva started crying now. I had never seen 
him so moved. ‘My wife was carrying him like this 
in her arms, bringing him home. Now, then, the son 
was carrying his mother in his arms… It was a very 
touching scene (näky) and metaphor (vertauskuva), 
so later at home I drew a picture of it…’ Oiva added 
that he had never shared that personal picture with 
his son. He couldn’t, he confessed.
This touching memory, which involved the most 
beloved persons in Oiva’s life, had taken the form of a 
mental picture, a snapshot in his mind, which he then 
worked with to create an art piece. The moment cap­
tured birth and death, the human cycle of life. Even 
though it depicted reality in a rather painful way, it 
was a beautiful picture, and there was nothing wrong 
with it. One can see a parallel between Sartre’s under­
standing of artistic creation and what happened with 
Oiva. His perception was artistic, even before he cre­
ated a concrete art piece about it. It was how his mind 
met with reality. From a Deweyan point of view, Oiva 
simply witnessed the fundamental characteristics of 
nature with its ever­continuing cycle of birth and 
death, whereas from a Sartrean point of view, his con­
sciousness intended reality in such a way that it con­
stituted a metaphysical understanding of the cycle 
of life. Whether we look at the story from Deweyan 
or Sartrean perspectives, Hepburn’s statement about 
‘aesthetics revealing something fundamental about 
how things really are’ is again apt here.
Aesthetics as metaphysical meaning-making
Returning to my initial question regarding the story 
of Heidi and a blackbird – how did she suddenly 
understand her situation and approach death, and 
how did the incident become so meaningful to her 
that she needed to share it with me? – I believe that 
the aesthetics of the scenery helped Heidi to renew 
her relationship with the world and that it thereby 
reinforced her intentionality towards life and death. 
Aesthetic experience, which was constituted by per­
ceiving structure and rhythm in nature and also by 
feeling an embodied connectedness to nature, rein­
forced Heidi’s apprehension about the cyclical nature 
of existence, that is, the continuous cycle of birth and 
death. Following Langer’s line of thought, art can 
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be seen as ‘a non­discursive sign system to express 
and organize inner thoughts’ (William and Boyd 
2006: 287). Aesthetic experience creates patterns and 
rhythm for an otherwise chaotic situation, which can 
be hard to think of and speak about with proposi­
tional language. Seeing the world in this way enabled 
Heidi to discover a personal place in the larger con­
text of life; she was able to make sense of her coming 
death. The experience thus became metaphysical in 
its flavour: through the experience she was able to 
form and also express her understanding about the 
ultimate nature of being.
As Dewey and Hepburn point out, imagination 
can play a significant role here. It is because of the 
imaginative flavour of an aesthetic experience that 
such meaning­makings are possible. Aesthetics offers 
a possibility to assert a certain metaphysical perspec­
tive towards life and death; it can serve as a reinforce­
ment of one’s metaphysical views. Imagination in the 
context of aesthetic experiences can also be seen as 
virtuality, a concept that was especially important 
in Langer’s art theory. Aesthetics as virtual space 
and virtual time resembles some aspects of ritual. In 
both art and ritual, aesthetics creates a virtual space 
for absorbing, tolerating, and even celebrating ten­
sions and paradoxes of life. In this kind of virtual 
space, things otherwise impossible become possible. 
Similarly, in a ritual frame we enter a virtual ‘as if ’ 
world of possibilities (see Utriainen 2016).
We have looked in detail at how aesthetic mean­
ing­making happens, yet we have not discussed pos­
sible sociocultural reasons why aesthetics seems to 
offer a preferred way of handling these metaphysical 
issues. According to existentialism, perception of the 
world includes a priori values held by the perceiver. 
This is to say that the way in which consciousness 
intends the world is intrinsically dependent on the 
values of the person, and therefore the content of 
perception is ultimately determined by the perceiv­
er’s value system. Marcel has even claimed that the 
basic ontological experience of existence in general, 
the experience that something exists, is dependent on 
one’s desire for it; without desire, there is no experi­
ence (Deranty 2015). One could claim, therefore, 
that the phenomenon of actually having an aesthetic 
experience – rather than a religious one, for instance 
– is due to the subject’s prior values and perspectives.
The philosopher Aarne Kinnunen comes to a 
Detail from an installation ‘Picnic for the sad’ by Heidi Elisabeth Hänninen (Huuto Galleria, 2016). 
M
ai
ja
 B
ut
te
rs
109Approaching Religion • Vol. 6, No. 2 • December 2016 
similar conclusion in his important book on aes­
thetic experience, Esteettisestä elämyksestä (1969). 
10After using several theoretical approaches to ana­
lyse the concept of aesthetic experience, Kinnunen 
resolves that although an all­encompassing defin­
ition is impossible, aesthetic experiences surely exist, 
and they can even be life­changing in their import­
ance. The factors that determine whether a given 
experience is aesthetic – and not religious or cogni­
tive, for instance – have to do with the experiencer’s 
worldview. Regarding the foundation of an aesthetic 
experi ence, Kinnunen (1990: 104) writes: ‘…there 
may be a conception of art, moral ideology, or reli­
gion, or even epistemology. Without them it cannot 
exist.’11 Depending on one’s ideological worldview, 
aesthetic experiences can get different explanations. 
Kinnunen (1990: 105) adds that aesthetic expe­
rience belongs to the same category as mystic, reli­
gious, and peak experiences.12 In order to have a 
religious experience, though, one must have religious 
vocabulary and a worldview that renders it possible. 
This approach is akin to Ann Taves’s attributional 
theory which suggests that whether experiences are 
labelled ‘religious’ or ‘spiritual’ is dependent on the 
pre­existing beliefs and practices as well as the web 
of concepts related to them (Taves 2009: 163). In 
terms of the metaphysically meaningful moments 
my research participants shared with me, they did 
not include religious vocabulary, attributes, or defin­
itions in their stories (with the exception of Martti). 
Instead, their special moments were not only told 
with aesthetic vocabulary, but they were essentially 
about aesthetics. Even Martti, who gave his experi­
ence a religious interpretation, emphasized that it 
was the embodied auditory and visual aspect of the 
experience that was so impressive and perplexing to 
him.13 
10 I would like to thank Oiva Kuisma for recommending 
Kinnunen’s book to me.
11 ‘[Esteettisen elämyksen perustana] voi olla taide­
käsitys, moraalinen ideologia tai uskonto, vieläpä 
jokin tiedonkäsitys.’ My translation.
12 Kinnunen uses the term todellisuuskäsitys. Literally 
this means ’understanding of reality’, but I freely 
translate it here as ‘peak experience’. Another possible 
translation could be the Buddhist term satori, which 
expresses a sudden realization of the nature of reality.
13 My aim has not been to evaluate the religiosity of 
my research participants, but I have categorized my 
research participants emically. Of the four persons 
mentioned here, one adhered to a Christian world
Conclusion
My research suggests that some contemporary Finns 
relate to the existential crisis of dying via aesthet­
ics rather than religion. My research data includes 
a number of additional examples which were not 
possible to include here, but nonetheless pose other 
interesting aspects about the meaning of aesthetics 
to hospice patients (e.g. their process of making art, 
blog writing). Here I have focused especially on the 
actual experiencing of aesthetics, analysing it through 
the theories and ideas of Dewey, Merleau­Ponty, and 
Sartre. While I have examined how meaning­making 
happens in this context, important questions about 
the specific content of the patients’ metaphysical 
thought remain a matter of further study.
The theme of aesthetics emerged in a number of 
ways among the terminal patients. For some, aesthet­
ics provided a relief and a break from pain, whether 
physical or mental, by opening a window to some­
where else, occasionally even to another dimen­
sion of being. For others, aesthetics brought about 
a sudden realization regarding their existential situ­
ation. Aesthetic experiences meant different things 
to each of the patients, but for all of them aesthetics 
and metaphysics came together one way or another. 
Aesthetics provided a way of approaching and think­
ing about death, as well as a language to communi­
cate about it. Perhaps even more importantly, it was 
with the help of aesthetics that patients found a new 
type of meaningful relationship with the world.
In regards to the kinds of meanings my research 
participants found in these moments, for various 
reasons I have chosen the adjective ‘metaphysical’. 
Metaphysics is ultimately about negotiations over 
many aspects of quotidian life and matters of ultimate 
reality, including things that can be – but do not need 
to be – seen as religious or spiritual. Aesthetic experi­
ences can reveal fundamental aspects of ‘how things 
really are’. To some, these may at times point to some­
thing completely other, be it immanent and mundane 
or a transcendent other, as Hepburn (2004: 127) 
suggests. Opposed to religious traditions, aesthetics 
remains open for various interpretations in regards 
to metaphysical claims about ‘how things really are’. 
 view, but the other three had more ambiguous rela­
tionships with things ‘deemed religious’ (Taves 2009), 
ranging from believing in God but not following any 
Christian theology to having a very distant relation­
ship with God. 
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Yet aesthetics seems to enable and empower without 
propositional or theological limitations. Therefore, 
I would argue that aesthetics supports metaphysical 
meaning­making.
These findings about the meaningfulness of art 
and aesthetics to people in extreme existential crises 
naturally raise some questions about practical care 
for the dying. While art and aesthetics are known 
to be beneficial for well­being, by elaborating on the 
richness and diverse implications of aesthetic experi­
ences on an existential level, my study hopes to pro­
voke a deeper understanding of the transformative 
potentiality of aesthetics in palliative care. 
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